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Hierarchical Online Intrusion Detection for SCADA
Networks
Hongrui Wang, Tao Lu, Xiaodai Dong, Peixue Li and Michael Xie
Abstract—We propose a novel hierarchical online intrusion
detection system (HOIDS) for supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) networks based on machine learning al-
gorithms. By utilizing the server-client topology while keeping
clients distributed for global protection, high detection rate is
achieved with minimum network impact. We implement accurate
models of normal-abnormal binary detection and multi-attack
identification based on logistic regression and quasi-Newton
optimization algorithm using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno approach. The detection system is capable of accelerating
detection by information gain based feature selection or principle
component analysis based dimension reduction. By evaluating
our system using the KDD99 dataset and the industrial control
system dataset, we demonstrate that HOIDS is highly scalable,
efficient and cost effective for securing SCADA infrastructures.
Index Terms—Intrusion detection, SCADA networks, machine
learning, hierarchical online design, feature selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
H ISTORICALLY, industrial control systems (ICSs) areproprietary, making massive attacks against them vir-
tually impossibile [1]. The standardization of these systems
and increasing adoptions of common communication protocols
such as TCP/IP, Modbus and DNP3, and common operating
systems such as Windows and LINUX, despite of obvious
advantages on performance improvement and cost reduction,
have made the was-secrative information easier to access.
Consequently, modern ICSs are more vulnerable to attacks [2].
This is of particular concern to the supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) system [3], one of the most important
ICSs that typically includes large-scale processes in multiple
sites to control critical infrastructures such as smart grid, oil
and gas pipelines, water and sewage systems, etc. Breaches of
such systems lead to disastrous consequences. The intercon-
nections between the SCADA and external networks such as
the Internet and enterprise networks further expose SCADA to
large-scale cyber security threats. One of the typical examples
is the Stuxnet worm [4] discovered in 2010, which infected
more than 100, 000 computers worldwide and damaged almost
one-fifth of nuclear centrifuges in Iran by exploiting four zero-
day vulnerabilities of Windows systems.
To protect conventional information technology (IT) net-
works from cyber attacks, implementing intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDSs) has been a common practice [5]. IDSs
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are usually signature-based and/or statistical anomaly-based.
Signature-based techniques are highly efficient as they identify
the malicious data flow through whitelists or rules generated
from the characteristics of known attacks while anomaly-based
IDSs spot intrusions by comparing data flow with a principle
generated by statistic algorithms [6]. Anomaly-based IDSs are
comparatively less efficient as they adopt complex algorithms
and consume substantial computing resources. However, a
major advantage over signature-based IDSs is that they can
detect unknown attacks or mutants of known attacks.
Existing intrusion detection modules for conventional IT
networks cannot be directly exploited in SCADA networks
due to different network characteristics and system require-
ments [7]. For example, SCADA systems emphasize real-time
requirements and many SCADA devices have limited com-
puting abilities. The growing awareness of SCADA security
has motivated researches on SCADA-specific IDS. Among
them, many SCADA IDSs are signature-based to accomodate
the strict real-time constraint and often less computationally
powerful devices in the networks [8]–[13]. On the other
hand, many attacks are either unknown in prior or mutants
of their original form. Under these circumstances, anomaly-
based IDSs, particularly using machine learning algorithms
are advantageous. Yang et al. [14] applied an autoassociative
kernel regression model along with the statistical probability
ratio test and demonstrated the effectiveness of their de-
sign on a simulated SCADA system for intrusion detection.
Their training dataset consisted of 1, 000 observations, the
network traffic statistics of which are from Simple Network
Management Protocol. Linda et al. [15] proposed an IDS
based on two neural network learning algorithms: the Error-
Back Propagation and Levenberg-Marquardt, and tested their
model using datasets generated by software tools such as
Nmap, Nessus and Metasploit. Valdes et al. [16] investigated
two anomaly detection techniques: pattern-based detection
for communication patterns among hosts, and flow-based
detection for individual traffic flows, and showed that their
methods are capable of identifying basic attacks against the
Modbus servers in their distributed control systems testbed.
Zhang et al. [17] exploited the support vector machine (SVM)
technique and artificial immune system tested on the NSL-
KDD dataset to evaluate their distributed intrusion detection
system for the multi-layer network architecture of smart grid
and related SCADA systems. Maglaras et al. [18] presented
their SCADA intrusion detection module based on One-Class
SVM, training the network data offline with a dataset of
1, 570 packets. Brushi et al. [19] explored an estimation-
inspection algorithm using logistic regression, and evaluated
2their design on the testbed of Linux based PLCs, generating
a high detection probability with a zero false positive rate.
SCADA systems have the following properties. Firstly, they
belong to cyber-physical systems [20], which operate real-
time with low tolerance on packets delay. Secondly, frequent
patching and updating for SCADA intrusion detection modules
are unfavourable due to the inflexibility of the infrastructure
and the potential negative impact to the whole work process.
Thirdly, a high proportion of SCADA devices have limited
computing abilities for implementing sophisticated intrusion
detection modules. Fourthly, SCADA networks consist of
supervisory and control subnetworks. Each sub-network has
different characteristics. The hybrid nature of SCADA net-
works leads to some distinguished characteristics. In particular,
the features of field network flows are simpler and more stable,
making complex IDS unnecessary. Under these considerations,
we design a novel, highly scalable hierarchical online intrusion
detection system (HOIDS) for SCADA networks based on
machine learning algorithms. HOIDS is uniquely designed to
satisfy the real-time requirement in control systems by utiliz-
ing an IDS server-client topology where clients distributed at
fields perform intrusion detection using the learning principles
generated by a central IDS server. This is in sharp contrast to
existing work where IDS is independently implemented at each
node in the network and there are no interactions among the
IDS modules. By selecting the effective data features based
on information gain or reducing the dimension of the feature
set, the implementation of IDS clients can be simplified to
accommodate the SCADA devices without significant impact
on the detection accuracy. HOIDS is also flexible to adjust the
detection principles for clients based on practical requirements
to improve security.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section describes the proposed IDS designed for a
large-scale SCADA system under critical real-time require-
ments. The architecture and operating principles are described
in Subsection II-A. The detailed detection models, including
normal-abnormal binary detection and multi-attack detection
based on logistic regression and quasi-Newton optimization
algorithm are presented in Subsection II-B. In Subsection II-
C, we present the principles of information gain based feature
selection and principle component analysis based dimension
reduction to reduce the feature set and accelerate detection.
A. HOIDS architecture and principle
Fig. 1 (a) illustrates a typical SCADA system consisting
of the field networks, substations and control centre which is
connected to external networks such as the corporate networks
and the Internet. In the control centre, there are engineering
workstations (EWS), human machine interfaces (HMI), energy
management systems (EMS), historians, application servers,
etc. The network flow in the control centre is similar to that in
the external IT networks. One reason for this similarity is that
backend protocols [1] such as Open Process Communications
(OPC) and Inter-Control Centre Protocol (ICCP) work in
a client/server manner supported by TCP/IP over Ethernet.
Another reason is that control centre network is usually
connected to corporate business networks and the Internet. In
the substations, there are EWS, HMI, historians, servers, etc.
Field devices consist of intelligent electronic devices (IED),
remote terminal units (RTUs), programmable logic controllers
(PLC) and many other embedded machines. Generally, the
communication protocols used between substations and the
field networks are fieldbus protocols. Modbus, DNP3, etc., are
widely used, and normally, the networks are isolated from the
Internet and other external networks. Protocol gateway (PG)
is to translate messages among various protocols.
Due to the hybrid nature of SCADA networks, hierarchical
IDS deployment is proposed for different network components
as shown in Fig. 1 (a). First, the IDS system is composed of
IDS agents residing at all components of the SCADA network.
Intrusion detection is realized by machine learning algorithms.
Second, a client-server model is adopted with the IDS server at
the control centre, and three levels of IDS clients distributed in
the control centre, the substation networks and field networks,
respectively. The IDS server deployed in the control centre
is the command centre of the whole system, and all the IDS
clients communicate with and are controlled by the IDS server
in the control centre. Such arrangement is motivated by the
fact that field devices are usually simple electronics with con-
strained computing capability, and the amount of data traffic
between the field devices and substations is generally limited.
Therefore, it will be impossible for these field devices to
host IDS agents that execute full machine learning algorithms,
unless external computing modules are added specifically for
IDS. The client-server model can greatly alleviate the IDS
computing needs. It provides flexible IDS complexity for
different network components in a SCADA system. Third,
the IDS clients can be configured together with signature-
based techniques to strengthen security. Furthermore, the IDS
server has a holistic view of the whole network and can make
adjustment to the detection model of the clients, especially
when a certain client detects intrusion, to improve the overall
IDS accuracy of all the components in the network.
Fig. 1 (b) illustrates the mechanism of the IDS server in
the control centre and the IDS clients distributed at three
levels of the network. The IDS server with relatively high
computing ability mainly consists of the feature engine and
the principle engine. The feature engine is responsible for
collecting the features of network flows in different SCADA
network components, forming datasets, using the datasets
sequentially and periodically to train machine learning algo-
rithms and storing the generated principles for each IDS client
to the principle engine. The principle engine is responsible for
sending the detection principles to each IDS client sequentially
and periodically. The IDS clients deployed at different network
spots extract features of the real time traffic and apply the
received principles to analyze current data flows for intrusion
detection, launch alarm if anomaly is detected. The clients also
constantly send the extracted features and detection results
to the IDS server for periodically updating the training set
and detection principles online to ensure the accuracy and
timeliness of intrusion detection. The separation of training
and detection to server and client save considerable computing
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Fig. 1. (a) HOIDS schemes for SCADA systems. (b) Workflow of the HOIDS data transmission.
resources at the client side. Meanwhile such architecture al-
lows sophisticated machine learning algorithms to be adopted
and updated easily for the whole network. Different network
elements can use different IDS algorithms, both for training at
the server side and detection at the client side. Consequently,
this design is effective to reduce the global financial budget for
securing large-scale SCADA networks. We should also note
that most devices in the field networks have limited computing
abilities and stringent real-time requirement. Therefore, pre-
processing features by effective feature selection techniques
and dimension reduction methods will accelerate the detection
process and achieve online intrusion detection with minimum
impact on the accuracy of intrusion detection (demonstrated
in Section III). Furthermore, when an intrusion is detected at
a certain IDS client, the hierarchical design has the potential
to coordinate IDS detection at different network elements to
enhance SCADA security, for example, by adjusting the choice
of feature sets for the IDS client and its adjacent clients.
B. Logistic regression
In HOIDS design, we apply machine learning techniques to
intrusion detection. Specifically, we use logistic regression to
classify the training dataset and generate the detection model.
Logistic regression has been a powerful mathematical method
for classification problems [21]. Generally, different machine
learning algorithms have their own advantages. For HOIDS
implementation, logistic regression has more advantages over
other techniques. For example, the model of logistic regression
can be interpreted clearly as a probability, beneficial for result
analysis and model adjustment. As opposed to naive Bayes,
another probabilistic algorithm that makes classification under
the assumption of independent features, logistic regression can
generate the classification principle regardless of the correla-
tion among the training features. Compared to SVM and neural
networks, the training time of logistic regression is shorter.
SVM may generate many supporting vectors in the detection
model, reducing detection efficiency if applied in the HOIDS
design. Moreover, logistic regression is able to incorporate new
training data easily into the current classification model by
using stochastic gradient descent method, which is important
for industrial applications. Logistic regression is also efficient
to realize multi-classification with low complexity and high
accuracy by using the multinomial logistic regression [22]
(details in Section III-A), while some other machine learning
algorithms rely on the one-against-all approach to achieve
multi-classification. Therefore, logistic regression is an ap-
propriate machine learning algorithm that can be applied to
industrial network IDS. Next we present the principle of
normal-abnormal binary detection and multi-attack detection
based on logistic regression.
1) Normal-abnormal binary detection: In normal-abnormal
binary detection, the logistic regression classifier identifies
intrusive connections against normal connections. Here, in-
trusive connections can also be called abnormal connections.
Define the feature space of connections as X = RM , where
M is the number of features for each connection and R is
the set of all real numbers. The classification output space
can be expressed as γ = {+1,−1}, where +1 is a label
representing the abnormal connection and −1 representing
the normal connection. The training dataset D consists of N
connections, i.e., D = {X,y} = {(xi, yi), i = 1, 2, ..., N},
where X is a (M + 1)×N matrix representing N connections,
and each input connection xi = [xi0 xi1 · · · xij · · · xiM ]T
has xi0 = 1, and y is an N-dimensional label vector with
4each label yi ∈ γ. The classification model weights can be
represented by w = [w0 w1 · · · wj · · · wM ]T where wj
represents the weight of corresponding xij . In this case, we
need to maximize the conditional probability of getting y
given the correspondingX to generate the classification model,
i.e., maximizing
P (y|X) =
N∏
i=1
P (yi|xi) (1)
where
P (yi|xi) =
{
P (yi = 1|xi) for yi = +1
1− P (yi = 1|xi) for yi = −1.
(2)
Logistic regression uses the logistic function θ(z) =
1/(1 + e−z) to map the linear combination z = xTi w to a
value between 0 and 1. Let P (yi = 1|xi) = θ(xTi w), and
due to the property of logistic function θ(−z) = 1− θ(z), we
have P (yi|xi) = θ(yixTi w). Maximizing the joint conditional
probability (1) is equivalent to minimizing its scaled negative
logarithm, therefore we have the minimization of the objective
function Fbin for normal-abnormal binary classification
Fbin(w) = −
1
N
N∑
i=1
lnP (yi|xi) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln(1 + e−yix
T
i w).
(3)
It can be proved easily that the Hessian of (3) is positive
definite as long as X 6= 0 which holds in all practical cases.
Consequently, minimizing (3) is a global convex optimization
problem and can be solved using conventional gradient-based
techniques with a proper line search step. Here, we adopt the
quasi-Newton optimization implemented with the Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) approach and the back-
tracking line search method [23], which has been verified as
one of the most efficient optimizers for logistic regression [24].
The basic quasi-Newton algorithm is as follows: given initial
weights w0 and the tolerance ǫ, the weights will be updated
in the next iteration wk+1 = wk + δk . And δk = −αkSkgk
represents the updated step, in which gk is the gradient vector
of Fbin in the kth iteration, αk is a small positive value
decreasing the value of Fbin in the kth iteration, and Sk is
an (M +1)× (M +1) direction matrix. Both αk and Sk can
be obtained by different methods. Repeat the iteration until
convergence, i.e., ‖δk‖ < ǫ. The BFGS approach is to obtain
Sk iteratively according to
S0 = I
Sk+1 = Sk + (1 +
γTk Skγk
γT
k
δk
)
δkδ
T
k
γT
k
δk
−
δkγ
T
k Sk+Skγkδ
T
k
γT
k
δk (4)
in which I is an identity matrix of size (M + 1), and γk =
gk+1−gk. The back-tracking line search is an effective inexact
line search method to obtain αk by finding an α satisfying
Fbin(wk − αkSkgk) 6 Fbin(wk), of which details can be
referred to [25].
By minimizing (3), we can obtain the optimal classification
weight vector w and calculate the probability P (yi = 1|xi). A
sample will belong to y = +1 if the probability exceeds 0.5,
otherwise it will belong to y = −1. Since the logistic function
is monotonically increasing, compare the value of xiw with
0, and the sample connection will belong to y = +1 if the
value is positive, otherwise belong to y = −1.
2) Multi-attack detection: As mentioned above, logistic
regression can realize multi-classification with low complexity
and high accuracy by using the multinomial logistic regres-
sion due to the property of the probabilistic model. The
representation of the feature space, the number of input data
and the number of features are the same as the normal-
abnormal binary classification, while the classification output
space is γmulti = {0, 1, ...,K − 1}, where K represents the
number of class types. The classification model weights can be
represented by W = {w0,w1, ...,wk−2}. Note that W is a
(M +1)× (K−1) matrix, which consists of the classification
model weights for (K − 1) class types. And the objective
function of multi-class logistic regression for minimization can
be denoted as
Fmulti(W) = −
1
N
lnP (y|X) = −
1
N
N∑
i=1
lnP (yi|xi) (5)
where
P (yi|xi)=


ex
T
i wyi
/
(1 +
K−2∑
a=0
ex
T
i wa), 0 ≤ yi < K − 1
1
/
(1 +
K−2∑
a=0
ex
T
i wa), yi = K − 1
(6)
and note that
K−1∑
yi=0
P (yi|xi) = 1. By minimizing the multi-
classification objective function (5) using the quasi-Newton
optimization implemented with the BFGS approach, we can
obtain the optimal multi-classification weight matrix W.
To classify a new sample connection, calculate all the
P (yi|xi), yi = 0, 1, ...,K − 1 based on (6), and then the
sample connection belongs to the class type with the highest
probability. In this way, we can use the generated detection
principle to classify the testing dataset. Since the one-against-
all approach needs to train the binary classification for K times
to generate K model weights for all the classes, multinomial
logistic regression is more efficient than the one-against-all
approach.
C. Feature selection and dimension reduction
In HOIDS, especially for the field networks, we apply two
methods for preprocessing SCADA network data features.
The first method is to use information gain to denote the
significance of each feature, and select features with high
information gain to accelerate intrusion detection. Similar to
mutual information, information gain is the reduction in the
entropy of labels achieved by partitioning the labels according
to a certain feature. For a certain feature, the information
from labels will be changed if this feature is not included
in the system. As a result, the reduced label entropy is the
information the feature brings to the system.
For the training dataset D = {X,y} = {(xi, yi), i =
1, 2, ..., N} with M features of the input connections and K
classifications of labels, the information entropy H(y) of the
5label y can be obtained by
H(y) = −
K−1∑
k=0
P (yk) lnP (yk) (7)
where P (yk) = Nk/N , and Nk represents the number of
samples of class k in the training dataset.
Assume a feature Fm consisting of values {f1, f2, ...fS},
the information gain IG that feature Fm brings to the system
is
IG(Fm) = H(y)−H(y|Fm) (8)
in which
H(y|Fm) =
S∑
s=1
P (fs)H(y|fs) (9)
P (fs) = Nfs/N , and Nfs denotes the number of samples
which have the value fs in terms of feature Fm. Usually,
a feature with high information gain is preferred over those
with low information gain. Here, we exploit the concept of
information gain to select a feature subset to accelerate the
detection model training and online detection process.
The second method is to use singular value decomposition
(SVD) to obtain a low-dimensional approximation of the
original feature set [23], which is also known as principal
component analysis (PCA). We apply PCA to the covariance
matrix of the N feature vectors. The covariance matrix can be
calculated as
C =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)(xi − x¯)
T (10)
where x¯ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi denotes the average vector of the N
feature vectors. Since C is at least positive semidefinite, its
SVD is the same as its eigen decomposition. We can obtain
an approximation of variance matrix C by considering only
the K largest eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors
as
C = USUT ≈ UKSKU
T
K (11)
in which U = [u1 u2 · · · uM ] is an orthogonal matrix,
S = diag{σ1, σ2, · · ·, σM} with non-negative eigenvalues in
a descending order, UK contains the first K vectors of U,
and SK is the diagonal matrix containing the first K largest
eigenvalues. Compute the projection of the variation (xi − x¯)
onto the K-dimensional subspace spanned by UK as
zi = U
T
K(xi − x¯). (12)
We use zi as the new features for each connection. Since UK
includes K orthogonal vectors, the new features generated
by PCA are uncorrelated. The number of principle compo-
nents K can be chosen by finding the smallest K satisfying
K∑
i=1
σi
/
M∑
i=1
σi ≥ ρ, where ρ is the rate of variance retained.
This method is specifically effective when the original features
are heterogeneous and some may be highly correlated.
For the detection with a certain feature set, we use recall
and precision to measure the performance, which are the
critical performance measures for IDS. For the IDS binary
classification, true positive (TP), false negative (FN), false
positive (FP) and true negative (TN) denote the quantities
of intrusions identified as intrusions, intrusions identified as
normal, normal connections identified as intrusions and normal
connections identified as normal, respectively. Note that for
multi-classification, we define TP, FN, FP and TN as the
quantities of intrusions identified as correct intrusion types, in-
trusions identified as normal connections, normal connections
identified as intrusions or intrusions incorrectly identified as
different intrusion types and normal connections identified as
normal, respectively. Recall (r) is defined as TP/(TP+FN),
and precision (p) is defined as TP/(TP +FP ). For IDS, r is
important, while p can not be ignored as well, since intrusions
should be detected as many as possible, while alarms are sup-
posed to be real intrusions as many as possible. Specifically,
we use 10 × 10-fold cross-validation (CV) to evaluate r and
p for each selected feature combination. Compared with 10-
fold CV, the most widely used validation procedure, 10× 10-
fold CV can obtain more reliable performance estimation since
more estimates are always preferred [26]. Estimating the mean
of r for 10 × 10-fold CV are compared using confidence
intervals defined by r¯±tα
2
(n−1) s√
n
, in which r¯ and s are the
mean and standard deviation of r of the CV samples, tα
2
(n−1)
is the value of t distribution at (n− 1) degrees of freedom for
a (1−α) confidence interval, and n is the size of CV samples.
Estimation for the mean of p is the same as that for r. In this
way, we can choose the model of preprocessing the original
features based on the performance estimation of CV.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents the classification results based on the
logistic regression algorithm to simulate the intrusion detection
for SCADA networks. Note that network data flows have
unique characteristics specific to that type of network. For
example, the network data flows in a control centre are similar
to traditional IT networks, and thus the corresponding features
can be extracted by the corresponding IDS clients in a similar
way to those in IT networks. Therefore, we simulate the
network data in the control centre by exploiting the KDD99
dataset [27], the most widely used dataset for evaluating the
performance of an IDS designed for IT networks. On the
other hand, the network traffic in the substation and field
network can be simulated by the ICS dataset [28], [29]. All the
experiments are implemented by Matlab and run on a server
with Intel Xeon 8-core processor E5-2670 and 64 GB RAM.
A. Simulation of the SCADA control centre network
In this section, we present the simulation results of a
SCADA control centre network using the KDD99 dataset. In
our experiment, we exploit the KDD99 (10 percent) training
dataset for training and KDD99 testing dataset for testing. The
training dataset consists of 494, 021 samples with 41 features
(3 nominal and 38 numerical) and 22 different types of attacks
(e.g., Back, Land, Neptune and Smurf) that fall into four
categories: Denial of service (DOS), Probe, Remote to local
(R2L) and User to root (U2R). In the training dataset, there
are 97, 278 (19.69%) normal connections, 391, 458 (79.24%)
6DOS, 4, 107 (0.83%) Probe, 1, 126 (0.23%) R2L and 52
(0.01%) U2R connections. The testing dataset (consisting of
311, 029 samples with 41 features) contains 22 attack types
existed in the training dataset and additional 17 different
kinds of attacks. In the testing dataset, there are 60, 593
(19.48%) normal connections, 229, 853 (73.90%) DOS, 4, 166
(1.34%) Probe, 16, 189 (5.20%) R2L and 228 (0.07%) U2R
connections. The fact that the testing dataset does not have the
same probability distribution as the training dataset, to some
extent, makes the detection process close-to-realistic scenarios.
All the 41 features, including time- and host-based traffic
features, are derived from the characteristics of the network
data flow. In our simulation, we exploit 38 numerical features
for training and testing.
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION FOR THE KDD99 TESTING DATASET
Predicted Class
Norm DOS Probe R2L U2R r rPN
A
ct
u
al
Cl
as
s Norm 59579 790 172 44 8 0.983 0.995
DOS 6380 223451 20 0 2 0.972 0.969
Probe 1064 96 3004 0 2 0.721 0.730
R2L 16137 4 18 25 5 0.002 0.107
U2R 197 4 0 6 21 0.092 0.066
p 0.715 0.996 0.935 0.333 0.553
pPN 0.730 0.9995 0.925 0.880 0.105
Using the multinomial logistic regression to classify the
training dataset and applying the generated detection principle
to the testing dataset, we get the confusion matrix in Table I.
Compare these results (recall (r) and precision (p)) with
those obtained by the PNrule method [30] (recall (rPN ) and
precision (pPN )), a rule-based classifier applicable to scenarios
where different classes have very different distributions in
training data. As shown, the overall performance of both meth-
ods are consistent. This confirms the validity of multinomial
logistic regression. Logistic regression shows higher recall
and precision for U2R than PNrule, while PNrule achieves
higher recall and precision for R2L. In terms of R2L, logistic
regression may benefit from more training samples, since the
percentage of all R2L attacks in the training dataset is only
0.23%, while 5.20% in the testing dataset with additional 7
attack types not shown in the training dataset.
Next, we verify the performance of multinomial logistic
regression by comparing it with the one-against-all method.
To simplify the simulation, we randomly sample the training
dataset. Since the percentages of attack categories of DOS
(79.24%), Probe (0.83%), R2L (0.23%) and U2R (0.01%) are
uneven, we classify the attacks into 4 categories as Normal
(97, 278), Smurf (280, 790), Neptune (107, 201) and other at-
tacks (8, 752), which has the percentage of Normal (19.69%),
Smurf (56.84%), Neptune (21.70%) and Others (1.77%). With
the same percentage as the KDD99 (10 percent) dataset, we
randomly choose 800 Normal, 2, 320 Smurf, 800 Neptune and
80 Others to form the new training dataset (4, 000 × 38),
and 1, 000 Normal, 2, 900 Smurf, 1, 000 Neptune and 100
Others to form the new testing dataset (5, 000 × 38) such
that the probability distribution of the testing dataset become
similar to that of the training dataset. We first use logistic
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regression one-against-all binary classification to realize the
multi-classification. The in-sample error (Ein, the ratio of
misclassified samples to the total samples in the training
dataset) changing with the number of iterations for the new
training dataset is shown in Fig. 2. After 130 iterations,
Eins are 0, 0, 0.001, 0.002 for normal-nonnormal, smurf-
nonsmurf, neptune-nonneptune and others-nonothers binary
classifications, respectively. The global Ein for the training
dataset is 0.002. Out of 4, 000 training samples, 3, 993 samples
are classified correctly. The out-of-sample error (Eout, the
ratio of misclassified samples to the total samples in the
testing dataset) for the new testing dataset is 0.005. Out of
5, 000 testing samples, 4, 974 samples are classified correctly.
Next, we use the multinomial logistic regression method to
achieve the multi-classification. The global Ein for the training
dataset is 0. And Eout for the testing dataset is 0.0046. Out of
5, 000 testing samples, 4, 977 samples are classified correctly.
The multinomial logistic regression outperforms in terms of
7efficiency and accuracy.
B. Simulation of SCADA substation and field networks
To test the SCADA substation and field networks, we exploit
the ICS dataset gathered from a gas pipeline system [29] as
mentioned before. This dataset has 26 features, including 17
numerical features such as Invalid Function Code (a binary
bit indicating the validity of function code), Pump State (a
binary bit indicating the state of the pump: on or off) and so
on. Here we take the Multi-class Command Injection dataset,
an important part of the above ICS dataset, as an example to
analyze the ICS dataset. The Multi-class Command Injection
dataset models the issued commands from the master to
control the gas pipeline system, consisting of 28, 086 Good
commands, 2 Address Scan attacks, 9 Function Code Scan
attacks, 198 Illegal Setpoint attacks and 49 PID Modification
attacks.
To study the impact of features for the classifier, information
gains of each numerical feature are shown in Fig. 3. After
further analyzing the dataset, we find that F6 PID Rate, F8
Pipeline PSI, F14 delta PID Rate and F16 delta Pipeline PSI
are all constant, F3 PID Cycle Time, F4 PID Deadband, F5
PID Gain, F7 PID Reset are highly correlated, and F11 delta
PID Cycle Time, F12 delta PID Deadband, F13 delta PID
Gain, F15 delta PID Reset are highly correlated. Therefore, 7
features are left in the dataset for analysis after removing the
constant features and highly correlated features.
We present the 10 × 10-fold CV performance for the
dataset. The recall and precision for 10 × 10-fold CV are
presented using 95% confidence intervals in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5,
respectively. The features are reduced one by one in three
different ways: from the features with lower IG to higher
IG (blue lines), from the features with higher IG to lower
IG (red lines) and from a random order (yellow lines). The
95% confidence intervals of the last two reducing ways are
all less than 0.003, not presented on the figures for clearer
presentation. In Fig. 5, precisions have no meaning when all
the connections are classified as good connections, because
TP+FP is equal to 0, referring to the definition of precision.
From Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, we can see that reducing features
randomly or from those with higher IG can make both recall
and precision much worse than the original feature set, while
reducing features with lower IG can keep good performance
even when only 4 or 3 features are left in the feature set.
Note that although the recalls of red and yellow lines when
4 features are left are marginally above the blue line with
overlapping confidence intervals, their precisions are notably
less than the blue line. Therefore, we can conclude that
reducing the features with lower IG while keeping a few
features with higher IG is an effective way to select feature
subsets, able to accelerate training and detection while keeping
high recalls and precisions. Dimension reduction based on
PCA is also applied to the ICS dataset, shown as the purple
lines in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. The number of principle components
is reduced from 7, since the first 7 eigenvalues keep about
100% variance. The order of reducing new features is from the
ones with lower eigenvalues. The 10×10-fold CV performance
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is obtained by using the new features generated by projection.
We can see that when the number of new features is 6, the
10 × 10-fold CV performance is better than reducing the
original features with lower IG. Even when the number of new
features is reduced to 2, the recall does not show a significant
decline while having an increased precision. Therefore, for the
control networks, we can use reduced feature sets by PCA or
IG criterion to accelerate and simplify the IDS process without
much degradation of the detection performance.
Furthermore, recalls and precisions for each class are pre-
sented in Fig. 6. The yellow lines are the results of using the
7 features, comparable with the best work among 6 machine
learning algorithms in [31], which used 12 features in the
dataset and 2 of them are exploited in our dataset. The blue
lines are obtained by using 6 new features generated by
PCA, which improves the recall and precision of detecting
the Address Scan attack to around 0.1. Although the number
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of this attack is only 2 in the dataset, it is still meaningful
to improve the performance of detecting them. Moreover, we
process the Address feature among nominal features and add
it into our preprocessed dataset with 7 independent features,
making a total of 8 features. The results are presented with the
red lines. We can see that the recall and precision of detecting
the Address Scan attack get improved significantly to 0.700
and 0.567, respectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a novel hierarchical online IDS
based on logistic regression and quasi-Newton optimization
algorithm. The design of the IDS server in the control centre
and IDS clients distributed in the control centre, substation
and field networks can secure all cyber assets within the
SCADA systems intelligently, while at the same time reducing
the financial budget for the large scale systems. Furthermore,
the design of intrusion detection with smaller sets of features
based on feature selection and dimension reduction can accel-
erate the detection process to satisfy the real-time requirements
of SCADA systems and facilitate the implementation of the
hardware devices.
In the future work, we will implement HOIDS on a practical
SCADA testbed to record the network data flows, extract
significant features, generate detection rules based on machine
learning algorithms and realize online detection.
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